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THE  UNION  AS  A  SAFEGUARD  AGAINST  FACTION:
CONGRESSIONAL  GRIDLOCK  AS
STATE EMPOWERMENT
Franita Tolson*
This short essay, written for Notre Dame Law Review’s conference on congressional
gridlock, argues that gridlock is an expected and integral component of the legislative process.
The bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I of the U.S. Constitution make legis-
lation difficult to pass in order to protect the public from the whims of shifting congressional
majorities.  Nevertheless, gridlock that is based primarily on partisan considerations rather than
policy differences can be unconstitutional, as defined by Supreme Court caselaw, if it stymies
legislation that is in the public interest.  The remedy for “unconstitutional” gridlock is not judi-
cial action, however; the solution lies in devolving policymaking authority down to the states,
allowing them to address the problem as it manifests within their borders.  While not ideal, this
temporary fix has some federalism benefits as it encourages experimentalism in law and policy as
well as citizen participation in democratic processes at the state level.  Moreover, as illustrated by
recent controversies over immigration reform, when states take the initiative and craft policy to
address national problems, their assertiveness can help break the gridlock by forcing Congress’s
hand.
INTRODUCTION
In September of 2012, Republicans in the U.S. Senate blocked a jobs bill
that would have provided one billion dollars over five years to help military
veterans find work.1  Veterans have one of the highest unemployment rates
in the country, exceeding the national average of 7.8%.2  Most states are fac-
ing their own budget deficits, making it unlikely that they could fund such an
 2013 Franita Tolson.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Betty T. Ferguson Professor of Voting Rights, Florida State University College of
Law.  Special thanks to Kirsten Sencil for excellent research assistance.  The title of this
piece comes from THE FEDERALIST NO. 9.
1 See Karen McVeigh, Veterans’ Bill Voted Down by GOP as Senate Democrats Proclaim ‘New
Low,’ GUARDIAN (September 19, 2012, 2:53 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/
sep/19/veterans-bill-voted-down-us-senate.
2 See Gregg Zoroya, Veterans’ Jobless Rate Falls but Remains High, USA TODAY (Jan. 6,
2013, 8:16 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/01/06/vets-jobless-
rate-drops/1812667/ (“Veteran advocates caution that joblessness among this group
remains stubbornly high—well above the national unemployment rate of 7.8%.”).
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initiative.  Despite the importance of this legislation, the media reported that
Republicans in the Senate blocked the bill in order to deny the Democratic
President, Barack Obama, any legislative accomplishments prior to the
November 2012 election.3
This struggle over legislation that was once supported by members of
both parties illustrates how the United States political system is a paradox of
contrasts.  It is governed by a Constitution designed to minimize faction and
disperse ambition,4 yet political scientists concede that “democracy is
unthinkable save in terms of parties.”5  Despite our reliance on them, how-
ever, political parties in Congress have been responsible for blocking legisla-
tion that would further the interests of their constituents and that solves
problems that have proven intractable when approached on a state by state
basis, like the Veterans Jobs Corp Act of 2012.  The notion that our democ-
racy cannot function without parties has led us to overlook whether the
efforts of parties to block or defeat legislation in Congress that would other-
wise be in the interest of the people is unconstitutional.  Perhaps a more
precise question would be whether there are constitutional safeguards in
place that can and should prevent such gridlock from occurring.6
3 See Jennifer Steinhauer, Veterans’ Job Bill Blocked in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19,
2012, 5:31 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/veterans-jobs-bill-
blocked-in-the-senate/; see also THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE
THAN IT LOOKS (2012) (describing how the politics of hostage-taking have emerged result-
ing in a dysfunctional political landscape leading up to the 2012 general election).
4 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264, 266 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009)
(“In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress
the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature . . . . [a]mbition
must be made to counteract ambition. . . . But what is government itself, but the greatest of
all reflections on human nature?  If men were angels, no government would be
necessary.”).
5 E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 1 (1942) (“Parties and partisanship, it is
safe to say, are now regarded by those who are supposed to know as legitimate and neces-
sary features of the democratic political process.”); see also JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES?,
at 3 (1995) (“Political parties lie at the heart of American politics.”).
6 Another contributor to this symposium, Gerald Magliocca, defines gridlock as
encompassing four possibilities:
(1) there is a national consensus on an issue, but our political structure prevents
that view from being enacted; (2) there is a consensus among political elites
about a course of action, but party loyalty stymies compromise; (3) political elites
are deadlocked, but only because the voting system distorts public opinion; and
(4) the nation is genuinely divided and our politicians reflect that view.
Gerard N. Magliocca, Don’t Be So Impatient, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2157 (2013).  He argues
that the fourth definition of gridlock best describes our current situation, which is gridlock
based on legitimate grounds, and he concludes that we have to suffer through it, as there is
“no acceptable legal cure for a fractured Congress that is (broadly speaking) accurately
representing a torn nation.” Id. at 2157. I am not convinced that Magliocca’s second defi-
nition of gridlock is not at work here, but arguably, it is this type of gridlock that would
qualify as “unconstitutional” under my approach, or gridlock stemming solely from parti-
san considerations on an issue that is best addressed by uniform federal legislation.
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This Essay argues that gridlock that is “excessively partisan,” as defined
by U.S. Supreme Court precedent, is unconstitutional.  Thanks to political
parties, gridlock has reached beyond Congress and infected the states, and it
has the potential to put the entire system into a state of paralysis.  Neverthe-
less, the solution lies, not with the courts, but in those aspects of the constitu-
tional structure that devolve lawmaking down to the states.  In particular, the
bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I that make federal
legislation difficult to pass allow states to experiment with different policies
and procedures to address some of these problems on a local scale.7
The Framers of the Constitution adopted the bicameralism and present-
ment requirements to slow the process of federal lawmaking, permitting a
certain level of gridlock to persist within the federal system.8  This structural
quirk makes excessively partisan and unconstitutional gridlock difficult to
address, but the fact that states can exercise significant authority during these
times suggests that partisan gridlock, although unconstitutional, may result
in a net positive for helping to recalibrate the balance of power in our federal
system.  Indeed, the recent immigration case of Arizona v. United States9
stands as an example of state action in the face of federal inaction, and is
instructive of the systemic effects of excessively partisan gridlock in Congress.
While much of Arizona’s immigration law was struck down by the Supreme
Court, the small portion that was upheld makes the case a victory for Arizona
7 The United States Constitution provides:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States;
If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to
that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at
large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.  If after such Reconsidera-
tion two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together
with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsid-
ered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law.  But in
all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays,
and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on
the Journal of each House respectively.  If any Bill shall not be returned by the
President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented
to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the
Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a
Law.
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and
House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjourn-
ment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the
Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him,
shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives,
according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2–3.
8 See generally Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79
TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1326 (2001) (“[M]any of the Supreme Court’s most significant separa-
tion-of-powers decisions also safeguard federalism by preventing each branch of the fed-
eral government from circumventing federal lawmaking procedures.”).
9 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
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because it leaves the state with more expansive authority to legislate in a
domain that was previously thought to be exclusive to the federal
government.
As the Arizona case shows, focusing on structural safeguards to address
unconstitutional legislative gridlock is preferable to judicial action because
the highly charged political disputes that often trigger excessive gridlock
could undermine judicial legitimacy and make the Supreme Court appear
political.  In addition, it is doubtful whether there are any potential causes of
action to address gridlock that do not run afoul of the Speech and Debate
Clause of the Constitution or the ability of each House to choose the rules of
its proceedings.10  The states are not so limited in their ability to implement
solutions within their borders in response to the gridlock in Congress.
Despite the lack of justiciability, it is still important to identify a thresh-
old for when gridlock has exceeded constitutional bounds because, descrip-
tively, it lets us know when the system has broken down.  The Supreme
Court’s case law provides guidance on this point because, while there may be
some disagreement over whether there should be judicial action in this area,
many scholars agree that gridlock and the rules that promote it can be
unconstitutional.11  Like many other political issues resolved by the Court,
congressional gridlock that is based on “excessive” partisanship is unconstitu-
tional.  Excessive partisanship is the threshold that the Court has used to
describe what an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander would look like,12
and alternatively, when political patronage in state employment has
exceeded constitutional bounds.13  Since legislative gridlock likely is not justi-
ciable in the courts, the Supreme Court’s case law has little else to offer the
inquiry into gridlock’s constitutionality besides serving as a descriptive start-
ing point.
Pragmatically, the absence of a judicial remedy means that self-inter-
ested political factions in Congress can and will continue to block legislation
on purely partisan grounds.  While this certainly is not consistent with the
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.  With respect to one of the main causes of gridlock—
the filibuster—Josh Chafetz puts it succinctly:
The judiciary is (rightly) impotent in the face of the filibuster for two reasons.
First, cameral rules are nonjusticiable political questions.  But second, even sup-
posing that a court were willing to hear the claim, and even supposing that it
found that someone had standing to bring the suit, there is no one who could
properly be named as the defendant.  The Speech or Debate Clause would
require that the case be dismissed as against any Senators who were named as
defendants.  Who would be left to sue?
Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1036 (2011)
(footnotes omitted).
11 See, e.g., id. (arguing that gridlock and the state of the Senate in the twenty-first
century is unconstitutional).
12 See infra note 90 and accompanying text.  The legal scholarship has also latched on
to this idea that excessive gerrymandering is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Mitchell N.
Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781 (2005).
13 See infra Part I.B.
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constitutional text and structure given the Founders’ concerns about faction,
states retain authority to address issues that would otherwise go unresolved if
left to Congress.  During times of legislative paralysis at the federal level,
states have expanded authority to address short-term legislative problems.
Moreover, the devolution of this authority to the states may be best over the
long-term as our system settles back into the routine, state-protective gridlock
that is an intentional part of our constitutional fabric.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF GRIDLOCK: FRAMING THE PROBLEM
Gridlock is a problem that often delays or stymies action at the federal
level, but arguably, its use and presence in our political system is consistent
with the Framers’ intent.  In Article I, Section 7, or the Presentment Clause,
the Constitution provides that “Every Bill which shall have passed the House
of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be
presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it,
but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall
have originated . . . .”14  The Constitution further provides that a two-thirds
majority in both houses is required to override the President’s veto.15  This is
an extremely high threshold to meet to get legislation passed, but as James
Madison pointed out in the Federalist 51, this threshold is necessary to avoid
the concentration of power in the hands of a few and to respect separation of
powers.  As Madison famously stated:
[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in
the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each
department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to
resist encroachments of the others.  The provision for defense must in this,
as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack.  Ambi-
tion must be made to counteract ambition.16
As Rick Pildes and Daryl Levinson have argued, the emergence of politi-
cal parties shortly after the Founding rendered nugatory much of Federalist
51;17 the existence of parties also complicates the constitutional questions
surrounding gridlock that brings the legislative process to a virtual standstill.
As Levinson and Pildes observe, the homogeneity of the political party struc-
ture has undermined the traditional Madisonian conception of separation of
powers, a structural flaw that has, not surprisingly, led to ideologically unified
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
16 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
17 Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 2311, 2312 (2006) (“American political institutions were founded upon the Madis-
onian assumption of vigorous, self-sustaining political competition between the legislative
and executive branches. . . . [A]mbition would counteract ambition.  That is not how
American democracy turned out.  Instead, political competition and cooperation along
relatively stable lines of policy and ideological disagreement quickly came to be channeled
not through the branches of government, but rather through an institution the Framers
could imagine only dimly but nonetheless despised: political parties.”).
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party platforms and internal legislative rules that contribute to lockstep parti-
san support (and opposition) to each party’s governing agenda.18
Although our current system is an obvious departure from the Madis-
onian ideal, distinguishing “permissible” levels of gridlock from gridlock that
is “excessive” and therefore unconstitutional remains difficult.  In this sympo-
sium, Gerard Magliocca discusses gridlock that we have to “live with,” that is,
gridlock resulting from the fact that “the nation is genuinely divided and our
politicians reflect that view,”19 versus other types of gridlock that he believes
are not at work in our current political climate.  Arguably, one other form of
gridlock that he identifies, where “there is a consensus among political elites
about a course of action, but party loyalty stymies compromise,” better
defines the defeat of the Veterans Job Corp bill and also the obstructionism
present in other highly politically charged situations like the debt ceiling and
immigration debates.20  It is this level of gridlock, which centers on party
loyalty rather than a genuine divide over the issues, that is unconstitutional
because it undermines our system of federalism—and the protection this sys-
tem accords to individuals—in a meaningful sense.21
A. Reconciling Our System of Federalism with Partisan Gridlock
There are several federalism concerns presented by excessively partisan
gridlock in the legislative process.  Much of this concern is structural and
implicates the balance of power in our system.  The states, upon agreeing to
enter the union, ceded some of their sovereignty to the federal government,
hence the idea that the federal government is one of specific, enumerated
powers while the states retain “a residuary and inviolable sovereignty . . . .”22
This delegation of sovereignty was for the purposes of having a central gov-
ernment to address problems that are national in scope and that require a
uniform solution; this was the power the Articles of Confederation denied to
Congress—most action required the uniform consent of the states in order
to occur.23
This compromise between the states and the federal government is
reflected in the Constitution’s enumeration of powers to Congress in Article
I, and the Supremacy Clause’s determination that laws passed in accordance
with the Constitution are supreme over state law.24  The Supremacy Clause
prioritizes federal law, but only federal law that was passed consistent with the
18 Id. at 2383–84.
19 Magliocca, supra note 6, at 2158. R
20 Id. See generally MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 3 (discussing the American model’s R
dysfunction rooted in long-term political trends, a coarsened political culture, and a new
partisan media).
21 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (noting the benefits to the citi-
zenry that arise from the federal structure).
22 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 197 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
23 See Franita Tolson, The Popular Sovereignty of the Tenth Amendment (manuscript
on file with author).
24 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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constitutional text and structure.25  As Bradford Clark has argued, the Fram-
ers intended federal legislation to be difficult to enact because the
Supremacy Clause is a powerful structural safeguard that protects the regula-
tory authority of the states from being encroached by laws that do not comply
with the bicameralism and presentment procedures set forth in the Constitu-
tion.26  While the Framers, when writing the Constitution, arguably did not
expect gridlock to reach the heights that it has in modern times, the struc-
ture of the Constitution can address legislative standstill at every level
because gridlock itself is a constitutional feature.
The Constitution promotes gridlock systemically by giving the states a
substantial role in the composition of the federal government, which can
intensify the gridlock that occurs at every level of government.  First, the
state’s oversight of federal elections creates dissension within state legislative
bodies that bleeds over into Congress.  Article I, Section 4, also known as the
Elections Clause, gives states the authority to choose the “Times, Places, and
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,”27 a power
that the Framers viewed as key to preventing federal encroachment of state
regulatory authority, but instead, has indirectly contributed to legislative
gridlock.  For example, in 2003, the Texas Democrats fled the state in order
to deny Republicans the quorum necessary to push through a bill that would
have redrawn the state’s legislative and congressional districts, which had
already been adjusted after the 2000 census.28  Notably, the redistricting
occurred at the behest of Congressman Tom DeLay in an attempt to cement
the Republicans’ majority in the U.S. House of Representatives, contributing
to the partisan wrangling that had come to define the chamber.29
The state’s power over federal elections also stands in tension with other
constitutional provisions, noticeably contributing to the gridlock in Con-
gress.  For example, Article I, Section 5, provides, “Each House shall be the
Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members,”30 a
provision that states can potentially undermine through their power over the
“Times, Places and Manner” of elections.31  For example, in U.S. Term Limits
v. Thornton, the Supreme Court held that Arkansas violated the Qualifications
Clause because its state constitution prohibited anyone who had been elected
25 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 731 (1999) (“As is evident from its text, however, the
Supremacy Clause enshrines as ‘the supreme Law of the Land’ only those Federal Acts that
accord with the constitutional design.  Appeal to the Supremacy Clause alone merely raises
the question whether a law is a valid exercise of the national power.” (citation omitted)).
26 Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 91, 112 (2003).
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
28 See Nick Madigan, On the Lam, Texas Democrats Rough It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/01/us/on-the-lam-texas-democrats-rough-it.html.
29 Jeffrey Toobin, Drawing the Line: Will Tom DeLay’s Redistricting in Texas Cost Him His
Seat?, THE NEW YORKER (March 6, 2006), http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/03/
06/060306fa_fact?currentPage=all.
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
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to the House three times or the U.S. Senate two times from appearing on the
ballot.32  The Court so concluded by relying on an earlier case, Powell v.
McCormack, which held that Congress cannot impose qualifications on its
members other than those set forth in the Constitution, although it may still
determine whether those qualifications are met.33 Thornton resolved the
question left open by Powell—whether the states, rather than Congress, can
impose qualifications (to the extent that the ballot access restriction is a
“qualification”) on members of Congress.  The Court concluded that the
power to add to the qualifications for members of Congress is not one of the
powers that states had prior to ratification and therefore was not preserved
under the Tenth Amendment.34  The Court’s historically grounded holding
ignores the practical reality that imposing term limits on members of Con-
gress is one way in which voters can address the gridlock that often occurs
because long-serving and intransigent legislators have little incentive to bar-
gain given the high likelihood of reelection.35
Similar to the Elections Clause, the Electoral College presents another
opportunity for electoral disagreements to spill over into the legislative pro-
cess, and by implication, promote gridlock.  Indeed, the states’ authority
under Article II with respect to the allocation of presidential electors helped
a small minority in Congress hold the federal legislative process hostage for
decades.36 In the 1930s and 1940s, the Democratic Party became more pro-
gressive on the issue of civil rights, adopting a civil rights platform in 1948
and nominating President Harry Truman, who promised to enact civil rights
legislation during his term.37  A number of Democratic legislators, known as
Dixiecrats, opposed civil rights and had been able to successfully keep civil
rights legislation off the legislative agenda in the decades prior to the 1948
32 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995).
33 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969).
34 U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 802; see also Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 526 (2001)
(holding that an attempt to instruct a congressional delegation to work towards a federal
term limits amendment or have a notation placed by their name on the ballot was invalid
and was not a part of states’ reserved powers).
35 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., A Defense of State Constitutional Limits on Federal Congressional
Terms, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 97, 136 (1991) (“The regulation of qualifications by state consti-
tutions is precisely such a protection of the political process, because the regulation gives
the state peoples a means to insure that their federal representatives genuinely represent
their constituents.”).
36 MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 114 (2004) (“The growing
attentiveness of national Democrats to northern black voters and incipient changes in
southern racial practices generated a backlash among southern whites.  A few southern
politicians, such as Senators Josiah Bailey of North Carolina and Harry Byrd and Carter
Glass of Virginia, had always opposed the New Deal, but most had supported it, with the
implicit understanding that race relations were off limits to reform.  By 1936, southern
political opposition to Roosevelt was growing, because of racial concerns and conservative
discomfort with Roosevelt’s tilt to the left in 1936.”).
37 See Emile B. Adler, Why the Dixiecrats Failed, 15 J. POL. 356, 357 (1953).
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Democratic convention.38  This disagreement within the party reached its
apogee in 1948, when the Dixiecrats broke off and ran their own candidate,
Strom Thurmond, for President.39  Although they had little hope of winning
the presidential election, their goal was to control the 127 electoral votes of
southern states, denying either the Republican or Democratic candidate a
majority in the Electoral College and throwing the election to the House of
Representatives, where Thurmond would have a higher likelihood of gaining
the presidency.40  This plan failed, with the Dixiecrats gaining the electoral
votes of only four states, but this splinter group won well over a million popu-
lar votes.41  What is notable about the Dixiecrat strategy, however, is that they
would have been successful had they secured victory in only three more
states.42  Thus, our system is one in which the heckler’s veto can both stymie
legislation in Congress and also impact the outcome of the presidential elec-
tion.43  These are messy outcomes courtesy of our constitutional framework,
but it still does not resolve the question of whether all gridlock is consistent
with our federal system.
The Framers made the assumption, rightly or wrongly, that legislative
gridlock is an inevitable byproduct of countering ambition and filtering the
passions of the people so as to ensure that legislation is actually public-
regarding.44  Madison made this point in trying to articulate why the Foun-
ders chose representative government rather than a traditional democracy.
As he noted in the Federalist 48, unlike a democracy:
[I]n a representative republic . . . the legislative power is exercised by an
assembly, which is inspired, by a supposed influence over the people, with an
intrepid confidence in its own strength; which is sufficiently numerous to
feel all the passions which actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous as to be
incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions, by means which reason
prescribes . . . .45
38 See Ira Katznelson, Kim Geiger & Daniel Kryder, Limiting Liberalism: The Southern
Veto in Congress, 1933-1950, 108 POL. SCI. Q. 283 (1993); see also V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN
POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 329–44 (1984).
39 Adler, supra note 37, at 357. R
40 Id.
41 Id. at 358.  As historians have noted, the Dixiecrats won in these states because their
candidates were listed as the official candidates of the Democrat Party, which kept Harry
Truman from being listed on the ballot. Id. at 364.
42 Id. at 360.
43 See id. at 363 (noting that one of the criticisms of the Dixiecrat movement in the
south was that the movement was trying “‘to destroy the South’s Senators and Congress-
men—the South’s only chance’ to participate in the legislative definition of States’ rights”
(citations omitted)).
44 See Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1979) (the
primary role of the legislature is to reflect the will and preferences of the people). But see
Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Polit-
ics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1336 (1987) (explaining that “legislative selflessness” is not
“likely to obtain in the American polity or indeed in any robustly competitive, complex
political system”).
45 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 252 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 1999).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-5\NDL510.txt unknown Seq: 10 17-JUL-13 10:56
2276 notre dame law review [vol. 88:5
Yet, as has been well documented in the scholarly literature, the legisla-
tive process is not always rational and elected officials do not always act in the
best interest of their constituents because of the presence of interest groups,
who often advocate for legislation that is not in the national interest or the
public good.46  Similarly, the failure to pass legislation that could further the
national interest can also be blamed on special interest groups.  The political
party apparatus makes it much easier for these groups to highjack the legisla-
tive process because the parties have staked out specific policy positions in
order to distinguish their governing platforms from each other and gain
votes.  These interest groups simply align their interests with the party that
can best represent their position, and then they promise electoral defeat if
their interests are not promoted in Congress.47
In recent years, the level of polarization has significantly worsened the
legislative standoff in Congress, a process already complicated by the self-
regarding nature of elected officials.  As commentators have recently noted,
most of this polarization has been asymmetrical, with the Republicans in the
House of Representatives becoming increasingly more conservative than the
Democrats have become liberal.48  Who is to blame seems to matter little
when the end result is that the 112th Congress, which finished its legislative
session in January 2013, is the least productive Congress in sixty-five years.49
But the question of who is to blame (and their motivations) could be relevant
to resolving the issue of whether gridlock has reached a level that offends the
Constitution, which the next section explores.
B. Supreme Court Precedent and Unconstitutional Partisanship
Although the judiciary plays a significant role in policing the legislative
process, there is very little insistence on judicial intervention when Congress
is hopelessly deadlocked and cannot pass legislation.  Nevertheless, the idea
that excessive partisanship can be inconsistent with the Constitution is a view
that is in line with Supreme Court precedent.50  Although the Court is ham-
46 See, e.g., Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue
Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1620-33 (1988); Richard A. Posner,
Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 341 (1974); George J.
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 12-13 (1971).
47 See Steve Kornacki, Next Tea Party Targets, SALON (May 16, 2012, 12:36 PM), http://
www.salon.com/2012/05/16/the_next_republican_to_fall/.
48 See Harry J Enten, How Polarisation in Washington Affects a Growing Feeling of Partisan-
ship, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 28, 2012, 2:10 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentis
free/2012/dec/28/democrats-republicans-polarisation-congress.
49 Stephanie Condon, Five Big Issues for the New Congress, CBS NEWS (Jan. 4, 2013, 6:00
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57561973/five-big-issues-for-the-new-con
gress/; see also Jennifer Steinhauer, Congress Nearing End of Session Where Partisan Input
Impeded Output, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
09/19/us/politics/congress-nears-end-of-least-productive-session.html; Outgoing 112th Con-
gress Least Productive in 65 Years, CBS (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/video/
watch/?id=50138133n.
50 See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
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pered by the task of developing manageable standards to govern issues that
are inherently political, its caselaw still stands as a relatively clear articulation
of this principle.  The Court has been more successful in regulating excessive
partisanship in its patronage cases than in its redistricting cases,51 but not
without significant criticism from those who believe that the Court is ill-suited
to distinguish good from bad politics without completely undermining the
party system.
In Elrod v. Burns,52 for example, the Court held that the newly elected
Democratic sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, could not terminate his Republi-
can employees without running afoul of the First Amendment.53  The Court
concluded that the practice of political patronage violates the employees’
freedom of association because they are forced to further beliefs that are
contrary to what they believe in order to retain their jobs.54  In other words,
patronage is a way to starve the opposition party and tip the electoral process
in the incumbent party’s direction.  The Court recognized, however, that
forcing an elected official to retain employees that have adverse beliefs can
be detrimental to the administration’s ability to advance its own policies, at
least to the extent that the employees have policymaking positions.55  To
address this concern, the Court created an exception that allows employers
to terminate policymaking employees for political reasons, a holding which
implicitly recognizes that there are instances in which partisan affiliation is
relevant to assessing whether a person is suitable for employment.56 Elrod
usefully frames the principle that there are constitutional and unconstitu-
tional uses of partisanship in government.
Despite Elrod, the Court has had difficulty delineating when partisanship
is a legitimate criteria in deciding whether to hire, promote, demote, or fire
public employees.57  In Rutan v. Republican Party, for example, the Court
found that the Governor of Illinois’s practice of using a hiring freeze to insti-
tute a pseudo-patronage system violated the First Amendment, over the
opposition of four dissenters.58  The Governor prohibited any state agency
51 See infra notes 52-72 and accompanying text. R
52 427 U.S. 347.
53 Id. at 373.
54 Id. at 355.
55 Id. at 367; see also Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 92–115 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (describing how patronage has been a foundation for government employ-
ment since the beginning of the Republic).
56 Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367; see also Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (focusing less on
the employee’s status as a policymaker and more on whether partisan affiliation is a pre-
requisite to effective job performance).
57 Rutan, 497 U.S. at 64 (“To the victor belong only those spoils that may be constitu-
tionally obtained.”).
58 Id. at 66.  The Court explained that:
By means of the freeze, according to petitioners and cross-respondents, the Gov-
ernor has been using the Governor’s Office to operate a political patronage sys-
tem to limit state employment and beneficial employment-related decisions to
those who are supported by the Republican Party.  In reviewing an agency’s
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from hiring new employees unless he gave his permission,59 and in making
this decision, his office focused on voting behavior as a criterion for deter-
mining hiring and promotions.  The majority found that Elrod governed, and
therefore, the burden on the First Amendment rights of potential employees
was not justified.60  Yet, to present this as a clear application of precedent
belies the deep disagreement between the dissenters and the majority over
the role of partisanship in our system.  For Justice Scalia, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Kennedy, the patronage sys-
tem is key to maintaining the strength of political parties and by implication,
the stability of our system of democracy.61  Justice Scalia argued that elected
officials, rather than courts, should decide the validity of the patronage sys-
tem; moreover, patronage plays an important role in our democracy, helping
to maintain party strength, promote a two party system rather than one party
dominance, and moderate the policy differences between the parties.62  Jus-
tice Scalia recognized that there are drawbacks to the patronage system—
namely the risk of corruption and kickbacks—but he ultimately concluded
that the system does not have to be perfect, just reasonable under rational
basis review.63
While the division on the Court clearly centers on a disagreement over
whether the government can dismiss non-policymaking employees for parti-
san reasons, more telling is the point of agreement—that partisan affiliation
can be relevant when it comes to policymaking employees.  As the Court rec-
ognized in Elrod, “Limiting patronage dismissals to policymaking positions is
sufficient to [address the concern that] representative government not be
request that a particular applicant be approved for a particular position, the Gov-
ernor’s Office has looked at whether the applicant voted in Republican primaries
in past election years, whether the applicant has provided financial or other sup-
port to the Republican Party and its candidates, whether the applicant has prom-
ised to join and work for the Republican Party in the future, and whether the
applicant has the support of Republican Party officials at state or local levels.
Id.
59 Id. at 65.
60 Id. at 68–71.
61 Id. at 104-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62 Id. at 106–07.  Justice Scalia wrote:
The patronage system does not, of course, merely foster political parties in gen-
eral; it fosters the two-party system in particular.  When getting a job, as opposed
to effectuating a particular substantive policy, is an available incentive for party
workers, those attracted by that incentive are likely to work for the party that has
the best chance of displacing the “ins,” rather than for some splinter group that
has a more attractive political philosophy but little hope of success.  Not only is a
two-party system more likely to emerge, but the differences between those parties
are more likely to be moderated, as each has a relatively greater interest in
appealing to a majority of the electorate and a relatively lesser interest in further-
ing philosophies or programs that are far from the mainstream.  The stabilizing
effects of such a system are obvious.
Id.
63 Id. at 110.
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undercut by tactics obstructing the implementation of policies of the new
administration . . . .”64  Nevertheless, drawing the line between constitutional
and unconstitutional partisanship continues to be a source of dissension
between the majority and the dissenters that extends beyond its patronage
cases to its partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence.
The Court has split in its partisan gerrymandering cases along the same
lines as its patronage jurisprudence, with Justice Stevens as the lone outlier
requiring complete government neutrality in official decisionmaking.65  In
Vieth v. Jubelirer,66 a plurality of the Supreme Court held that partisan gerry-
mandering claims are nonjusticiable, concluding that “[t]he Constitution
clearly contemplates districting by political entities, see Article I, § 4, and
unsurprisingly that turns out to be root-and-branch a matter of politics.”67  In
arriving at this conclusion, the plurality looked at the text of the Elections
Clause, which, in the view of these justices, provides a remedy for partisan
gerrymandering by allowing Congress to “make or alter” districts drawn by
the states.68  The plurality also noted that Congress has used its power to
regulate elections and reduce gerrymandering by passing the Apportionment
Acts of 1842, 1862, and 1901, which initially instituted requirements of conti-
guity, population equality, and compactness in redistricting.69
Vieth also highlights the reality that, over the course of four decades,
some forms of partisan gerrymandering have morphed from constitutionally
suspect to constitutionally protected.70  In Reynolds v. Sims71 and Wesbury v.
Sanders,72 the Supreme Court held that states violated the Equal Protection
Clause when they failed to redraw their legislative districts in order to achieve
absolute population equality;73 as I have argued elsewhere, this failure to
redistrict was, in effect, a type of partisan gerrymander that insulated incum-
bent representatives from electoral competition.74 Davis v. Bandemer,75
where the Court first held partisan gerrymandering claims to be justiciable,76
is consistent with these early cases finding that the failure to redistrict is also
64 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976).
65 Only Justice Stevens would outlaw any consideration of partisan affiliation in gov-
ernment employment. See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 79-92 (Stevens, J., concurring).  He takes a
similar approach in the Court’s partisan gerrymandering cases. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541
U.S. 267, 317-41 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66 541 U.S. 267.
67 Id. at 285 (plurality opinion).
68 Id. at 275.
69 Id. at 276.
70 Id. at 274–77.
71 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
72 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
73 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568 (holding that under the Equal Protection Clause, both
houses of a bicameral legislature must be apportioned substantially on a population basis);
Wesbury, 376 U.S. at 7–8 (holding that “as nearly as is practicable, one [person]’s vote in a
congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s”).
74 Tolson, supra note 23. R
75 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
76 Id. at 113.
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constitutionally problematic. Vieth represented a dramatic reversal, finding
that some level of partisanship in the redistricting process can be consistent
with the constitutional structure.77
This mixed approach to partisanship in redistricting has affected the
Court’s ability to craft judicially manageable standards to address partisan-
ship that has crossed the threshold into unconstitutionality.78  This line-draw-
ing problem is a hallmark of most of the Court’s jurisprudence that directly
engages with and tries to regulate politics.79  The idea that the Court can
discern when politics has inappropriately infected the legislative process is
fanciful at best.
Rather, what these cases tell us is that partisanship, while relevant to offi-
cial decision-making, still can reach unconstitutional levels.  Whether it is
choosing elected officials, their employees, their constituencies, or crafting
actual policy, partisanship will infect the decision-making process.  But this
does not alter the reality that, as illustrated by the Court’s jurisprudence,
partisanship can be unconstitutional.  The plurality in Vieth and the majority
in Elrod both recognized this fact.  While the Court may not have an optimal
approach in determining when partisanship has crossed the threshold from
acceptable to unconstitutional, the constitutional structure does have some-
thing to teach us about how to survive highly charged political times.
Given their lack of foresight with respect to well-organized interest
groups, political parties, and the strength of partisan motivations, the Fram-
ers predictably could not have foreseen that political parties would unite leg-
islators at every level of government,80 and that the unifying banner of the
party label would allow legislative gridlock to bleed over into every level of
government.  As the next section shows, despite the shortcomings of the con-
stitutional structure, the answer still lies in the Founders’ design.
77 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 275, 285 (2004) (arguing that the Framers antici-
pated that redistricting would be a political endeavor which is why they provided a textual
remedy in the Elections Clause); see also Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 952 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that in Vieth “all but one of the Justices agreed” that ‘politics as usual’
is a traditional redistricting criterion). Compare Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740
(1983) (recognizing the incumbency protection is a legitimate redistricting criteria), with
League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 447 (2006) (using
§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act to invalidate an incumbent-protecting gerrymander).
78 See Franita Tolson, Benign Partisanship, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 395, 401 (2012).
79 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (providing the roots for
the political question doctrine); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (1 How.) 1 (1849) (finding the
“Republican Form of Government” clause in Article IV nonjusticiable).
80 See generally Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 215 (2000) (arguing that the Founders did not antici-
pate the development of political parties would “erode[ ] what the Founders had assumed
would be a natural, permanent antagonism between state and national politicians”).
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II. OUR DEFECTIVE CONSTITUTION: ADDRESSING EXCESSIVELY PARTISAN
GRIDLOCK THROUGH THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
This section of the Essay focuses on ways in which the constitutional
structure can address the problem of excessively partisan gridlock, much of
which stems from the internal rules adopted by Congress in enacting policy
and is exacerbated by the rigid ideological adherence of political parties to
their policy agendas.  The impasse created by gridlock can shift the power
structure from the federal governments to the states, leaving them with sub-
stantial authority through their control over congressional redistricting and
their own legislative mechanisms to pass laws during times of congressional
gridlock.
Scholars have spent some time focusing on how micro-level rules have
worsened the levels of gridlock in Congress,81 but very little attention has
been given to how this might strengthen the position of the states.  There is
substantial literature on the constitutionality of the filibuster and other rules
that govern the legislative process, and how these rules contribute to the
impasse that we see in Congress today.82  Although the Constitution gives
both houses of Congress the authority to “determine the Rules of its Proceed-
ings,”83 some commentators have argued that the adoption of supermajority
requirements in order to pass bills raising taxes in the House,84 and the use
of the filibuster in the Senate, which refers to the ability of a minority of
senators to invoke the chamber’s rule of unlimited debate in order to
obstruct any action on a bill, are unconstitutional.85  Because of the filibus-
ter, two-thirds of the Senate, or sixty senators, have to agree to invoke cloture
and end debate in order to force a vote on a bill.86  Josh Chafetz in particular
has argued that the filibuster cannot be constitutional because “the Constitu-
tion cannot countenance permanent minority obstruction in a house of Con-
gress.”87  This analysis is relevant here, where the gridlock that raises
constitutional concerns is promoted through the use of House and Senate
rules for the sole promotion of partisan ends.
81 See, e.g., infra notes 81 and 83.
82 See, e.g., Chafetz, supra note 10, at 1040 (arguing the filibuster is unconstitutional R
“for it violates a structural principle against permanent minority obstruction in a house of
Congress”); Gerard N. Magliocca, Reforming the Filibuster, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 303, 303
(2011) (“The most troubling countermajoritarian difficulty in modern constitutional law is
Rule XXII of the United States Senate.”); John C. Roberts, Gridlock and Senate Rules, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2189 (2013) (arguing that the Constitution demands “the power of a
simple majority of members [of the Senate] present to adopt or amend rules governing
the day-to-day business of the Senate at any time.  Under this principle, the filibuster itself
is not unconstitutional if a majority of senators wish to allow it for institutional reasons”).
83 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
84 See Brett W. King, Deconstructing Gordon and Contingent Legislative Authority: The Con-
stitutionality of Supermajority Rules, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 133, 136 (1999).
85 See Chafetz, supra note 10, at 1007–08. R
86 Id. at 1007.
87 Id. at 1015.
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While it is debatable whether there is any legal recourse to challenge the
filibuster or other internal rules that stymie the legislative process,88 there
are structural solutions that can help to break up gridlock in the interim.  For
example, where there is congressional gridlock and it undermines legislation
seeking to address a problem that can be resolved best through a uniform
solution, states can address the gridlock by pressuring their congressional
delegations to act.89  Under the Elections Clause, states draw the district lines
for state legislative and congressional districts.90  Because the use of partisan-
ship in official decision-making is constitutional, the Supreme Court has, in a
series of fractured opinions discussed in Part I.B, endorsed the use of parti-
sanship in redistricting up to a certain threshold.91
The ability to partisan gerrymander is a tool that a state can use in order
to influence its congressional delegation and federal policy in ways favorable
to its interests.92  The state, which can be a partisan entity, can use the threat
or promise of a gerrymander in order to make its congressional delegation
more responsive to its interests.93  Its interests may be consistent with
allowing a legislatively unproductive Congress to persist because in some
sense this allows the states to exercise more regulatory authority within their
spheres, but arguably, the state could also press its delegation to do more to
break the impasse in Congress.  Indeed, the ability of states to legislate dur-
ing times of congressional gridlock, specifically to address national problems
that may uniquely affect the interests of a particular state within its borders, is
consistent with the states’ authority under the Tenth Amendment.94
Undeniably, there is a risk that such state action could step on federal
toes, but there are benefits that must be considered as well.  In particular,
state legislation to fill the gaps in federal lawmaking can have some federal-
88 Id. at 1036. See generally John Cornyn, Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and the
Need for Filibuster Reform, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 211 (2003) (explaining the prob-
lem of judicial confirmations, specifically filibusters).
89 See, e.g., Franita Tolson, Partisan Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of Federalism, 2010
UTAH L. REV. 859, 862 (“When states gerrymander congressional districts pursuant to their
power under the Elections Clause, they are in fact furthering the federalism embodied in
the Clause when the gerrymandering results in the election of congressional representa-
tives that are responsive to state interests.”).
90 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1.
91 Compare League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 423
(2006) (analyzing and rejecting political gerrymandering claim), with Vieth v. Jubelirer,
541 U.S. 267, 355 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (recognizing the existence of political
gerrymandering claim).
92 See Tolson, supra note 89, at 862.
93 See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 399–400 (arguing that the 2003 redistricting in Texas and
the resulting congressional delegation made the national legislature more responsive to
Texas’ interests); Tolson, supra note 89, at 895–96 (discussing this phenomenon in the
context of the Affordable Care Act).
94 See Tolson, supra note 23 (arguing that states have discretion under the Tenth R
Amendment to structure their governments and govern as they see fit so long as it exceeds
the threshold imposed by the Guarantee Clause).
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ism benefits that may be worth emphasizing.  In Gregory v. Ashcroft,95 the
Supreme Court noted that, among the many benefits of the federalist system:
It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the
diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen
involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and
experimentation in government; and it makes government more responsive
by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.96
Giving states the opportunity to solve national problems from a micro-
level perspective would seem to promote most, if not all, of these goals of
federalism.  Indeed, if the federal government does not like a state’s
approach to a particular problem, this could motivate Congress to finally
break the gridlock and act itself.
The recent case of Arizona v. United States97 and the issue of immigration
reform are instructive on this point.  Both political parties have long acknowl-
edged that immigration reform has to be on the horizon, but little has been
done because of legislative gridlock in Congress.98  To circumvent this
gridlock, in 2012, President Barack Obama issued an executive order
allowing some undocumented individuals, brought into the country through
no fault of their own, to remain in the United States.99
This stopgap measure, although needed, did not address many of the
problems stemming from illegal immigration that can only be addressed by
comprehensive immigration reform.  Arizona got tired of waiting for Con-
gress to act on this issue because the presence of undocumented individuals
within its borders had, in its view, become a public safety concern.100  In
2010, Arizona passed the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighbor-
hoods Act, more commonly known as SB 1070, in order to regulate undocu-
95 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
96 Id. at 458.
97 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
98 See Stephanie Condon, Despite Decades of Effort, Immigration Reform Still Eludes Con-
gress, CBS NEWS (Feb. 5, 2013, 1:02 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-575675
83/despite-decades-of-effort-immigration-reform-still-eludes-congress/.
99 Exec. Order No. 13,597, 77 Fed. Reg. 3373 (Jan. 19, 2012).
100 The Supreme Court described the problem as such:
Arizona bears many of the consequences of unlawful immigration.  Hundreds of
thousands of deportable aliens are apprehended in Arizona each year.  Unautho-
rized aliens who remain in the State comprise, by one estimate, almost six percent
of the population.  And in the State’s most populous county, these aliens are
reported to be responsible for a disproportionate share of serious crime.
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2500 (citations omitted); see also id. at 2517 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Government complains that state officials
might not heed ‘federal priorities.’  Indeed they might not, particularly if those priorities
include willful blindness or deliberate inattention to the presence of removable aliens in
Arizona.  The State’s whole complaint—the reason this law was passed and this case has
arisen—is that the citizens of Arizona believe federal priorities are too lax.  The State has
the sovereign power to protect its borders more rigorously if it wishes, absent any valid
federal prohibition.”).
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mented individuals within its borders because it felt that the federal
government had failed to successfully resolve the problem of illegal immigra-
tion or secure the U.S. borders to prevent the influx of undocumented indi-
viduals.101  The U.S. government filed suit, claiming that federal law
comprehensively regulated immigration and the status of undocumented
immigrants, and therefore, preempted SB 1070.102  In SB 1070, the state of
Arizona tried to address what it felt were lapses in coverage: Section 3 of SB
1070 “forbids the ‘willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration
document . . . in violation of 8 United States Code section 1304(e) or
1306(a)”; Section 5(C) “makes it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien
to seek or engage in work in the State”; Section 6 “authorizes officers to
arrest without a warrant a person ‘the officer has probable cause to
believe . . . has committed any public offense that makes the person remova-
ble from the United States’”; and finally, Section 2(B) “provides that officers
who conduct a stop, detention, or arrest must in some circumstances make
efforts to verify the person’s immigration status with the Federal
Government.”103
The Supreme Court held that federal law preempts the first three provi-
sions of SB 1070 listed above.104  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
described the federal government’s authority over immigration as “broad”
and “undoubted,” resting on “the National Government’s constitutional
power to ‘establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,’ and its inherent
power as sovereign to control and conduct relations with foreign nations.”105
Because of this broad authority, the Court viewed Arizona’s attempt to
supplement federal law as problematic in several respects.  In particular, Sec-
tion 3’s attempt to add a state law penalty for conduct already proscribed by
federal law undermined the careful balance of the federal scheme because it
would have allowed Arizona to prosecute individuals even in circumstances
in which the federal government has determined that prosecution might
frustrate federal policies.106  The provisions of Arizona law that created crim-
inal prohibitions where no federal counterpart existed were also problematic
because they could have frustrated the goals of federal policy and under-
mined the work of federal officers who have received specialized training on
immigration policy.107
101 Id. at 2497.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 2497–98, 2501 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
104 Id. at 2510 (holding §§ 3, 5(C), and 6 are preempted but § 2(B) is not).
105 Id. at 2498 (citations omitted).
106 Id. at 2502–03.
107 Id. at 2503–04 (discussing Section 5(C) and arguing that the immigration frame-
work adopted by Congress, which punishes the employer for hiring undocumented work-
ers and not the workers themselves like Section 5(C), “reflects a considered judgment that
making criminals out of aliens engaged in unauthorized work—aliens who already face the
possibility of employer exploitation because of their removable status—would be inconsis-
tent with federal policy and objectives”); see also id. at 2506 (“Section 6 attempts to provide
state officers even greater authority to arrest aliens on the basis of possible removability
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What is notable, however, is that the Supreme Court did not invalidate
the Arizona immigration law in its entirety.  The Court upheld Section 2(B),
which requires state officers to “make a ‘reasonable attempt . . . to determine
the immigration status’ of any person they stop, detain, or arrest on some
other legitimate basis if ‘reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an
alien and is unlawfully present in the United States.”108  The Court rejected
the argument that this provision interferes with the federal immigration
scheme because federal law encourages state officials to contact federal offi-
cials for information regarding immigration status; thus, a state law requiring
law enforcement to check the immigration status of anyone who is lawfully
detained is consistent with federal policy.109
Arizona stands for the proposition that the states can act where the fed-
eral government has failed to act or, alternatively, failed to enforce its own
policies, so long as their actions do not frustrate the goals of federal law, and
Congress has not indicated its intent to occupy the field.110  Despite these
limitations, this authority is still a meaningful way to address gaps in federal
policy that persist because of Congress’s inability to act due to gridlock.
Given that undocumented individuals have some impact on state resources
and the scope of state regulation, the states have latitude to address federal
policy failures or lapses in enforcement, consistent with their authority under
the Tenth Amendment.111
CONCLUSION
The solution to legislative gridlock lies, not with the courts, but in those
structural safeguards that anticipate faction and push lawmaking down to the
states.  The stringent requirements that legislation pass both houses of Con-
gress and be presented to the President in order to become law show that the
Framers anticipated some level of gridlock, indeed invited it, to prevent the
federal government from usurping the authority of the states through erro-
neous and ill-conceived legislation.  As the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
indicates, however, excessive gridlock based solely on partisan considerations
can be unconstitutional.  While the Court cannot comfortably delineate
when gridlock that is motivated by excessive partisanship has crossed the line
into unconstitutionality, its jurisprudence still provides a useful guidepost to
determine when the legislative standstill in Congress has reached a point of
concern.  Unconstitutional gridlock can pose significant risks to our system
of federalism, at least to the extent that the Constitution allocates to Con-
gress the responsibility of crafting uniform solutions to problems that defy
than Congress has given to trained federal immigration officers . . . allow[ing] the State to
achieve its own immigration policy.”).
108 Id. at 2507 (alteration in original) (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11–1051(B)
(2012)).
109 Id. at 2508–10.
110 Id. at 2510.
111 Id. at 2518–19 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
the state is defending its own sovereign interests in enacting its immigration policy).
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state level action and gridlock undermines this task.  Indeed, the structural
solution is more apparent than the judicial one: our system of federalism is
fluid, and gridlock in Congress pushes more power down to the states,
allowing them to act when Congress cannot.
The problem is that state level solutions are often insufficient to address
problems that benefit from uniformity.  Despite this difficulty, the shifting
balance of legislative power from Congress to the states is consistent with the
constitutional design, which permits states to serve as the forums of first
resort, increasing the legislative experimentalism that is supposed to be the
hallmark of a federal system.  It also allows the states to narrowly address
national issues to the extent that they pose unique problems within the
state’s borders. Arizona v. United States makes it clear that states retain author-
ity to legislate concurrently with the federal legislative scheme, which is key
in times of congressional gridlock.
